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Abstract 
Much attention has been focused in recent years on the ethical acceptability of physicians 
receiving gifts from drug companies.  Professional guidelines recognize industry gifts as a 
conflict of interest and establish thresholds prohibiting the exchange of large gifts while 
expressly allowing for the exchange of small gifts, such as pens, note pads, and coffee.  
Considerable evidence from the social sciences suggests that gifts of negligible value can 
influence the behavior of the recipient in ways the recipient does not always realize.  Policies 
and guidelines that rely on arbitrary value limits for gift giving or receipt should be 
reevaluated. 
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Health care professionals commonly receive small gifts, such as pens and note pads, 
from drug companies seeking to influence their prescribing practices.  Gifts, both large and 
small, have been used by the pharmaceutical industry for almost a century to promote 
specific products and establish brand recognition (Shaughnessy et al. 1994; Clark 1989).  The 
presumption is that large gifts, such as extravagant vacations, have the capacity to influence 
behavior, but gifts of de minimis monetary value, such as donuts and penlights, do not.  Yet, 
while it may seem both logical and practicable to distinguish small gifts from larger, 
seemingly more problematic gifts, a large body of evidence from the social sciences shows 
that behavior can be influenced by gifts of negligible value.  
Policy Background 
 In the 1980s, the large cash payments and lavish gifts some physicians received from 
drug companies captured public attention (Senate Committee on Labor and Human 
Resources 1990).  There was concern that physician integrity was falling victim to 
commercial influence in ways that were costly to the health care system in terms of both 
dollars and public trust.  Congressional hearings on pharmaceutical promotion led the 
American Medical Association (AMA) and the Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers 
Association (PhRMA) to adopt voluntary guidelines prohibiting the exchange of cash 
payments and gifts valued over $100 (OIG 1991).  Under these guidelines, inexpensive gifts, 
such as pens and notepads, were expressly allowed providing they “relate” to medical 
practice.  The Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human 
Services, in a set of studies examining marketing practices, questioned the extent to which 
those guidelines were being enforced and suggested that allowing small gifts may be contrary 
to the public interest (OIG 1991, OIG 1992). 
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 Numerous studies of pharmaceutical marketing practices were performed during the 
1990s.  These studies suggest that the pharmaceutical industry exercised considerable 
influence over physician prescribing practices and formulary composition (Wazana 2000).  
The $12 billion spent annually by the industry on gifts and payments to physicians drew 
attention from the DHHS Office of the Inspector General and a large-scale study of 
marketing practices was budgeted for 2002.  The study was to examine whether all drug 
company gifts present an inherent conflict of interest or even a violation of federal anti-
kickback legislation (DHHS 2001).   However, it was subsequently deleted from the OIG’s 
research agenda (Robert Brown, personal communication, 2003). 
 In 2001, the AMA and PhRMA responded to the government’s renewed interest in 
gift giving by launching a joint educational campaign.  Nine large pharmaceutical companies 
contributed a total of $675,000 and the AMA contributed $50,000 plus staff time in an effort 
to remind physicians, medical students, and pharmaceutical sales representatives of the 
importance of following the 1990 guidelines (Okie 2001).  During this time, the American 
College of Physicians and the American Society of Internal Medicine issued a position paper 
that recognized the potential for small gifts to compromise clinical judgment, but stopped 
short of calling for the practice to cease (Coyle 2002).   
In May 2002, PhRMA issued a new, voluntary code for self-regulation of industry 
interactions with physicians.  The code continues to allow for the exchange of gifts valued 
less than $100, but puts “items of minimal value” in their own category.  Whereas gifts under 
$100 can only be given “on occasion” and must primarily benefit patients, gifts of minimal 
value, including calendars and stress dolls, should benefit medical practice and can be given 
 4
with any frequency.  Snacks and modest meals are permissible so long as they are consumed 
while listening to the sales pitch of a company representative (PhRMA 2002). 
No studies have been conducted specifically on the affect of de minimis gifts on 
physician prescribing practices.  This may be due in part to the presumption that the size or 
value of a gift correlates with its potential to influence the recipient.  Thus the larger and 
more valuable the gift, the weightier are the ethical concerns raised about the industry’s 
influence over physicians.  Until recently, de minimis gifts generated little moral or 
regulatory concern.   
Today, groups such as Public Citizen (Tanner 2001), Physicians for a National Health 
Program (www.pnhp.org), American Medical Student Association (Romano 2002) and No 
Free Lunch (nofreelunch.org) oppose all industry gift giving on the belief that the practice 
conflicts with the professional duties of physicians.  The OIG has also issued draft 
compliance guidelines that suggest industry gift giving may violate federal anti-kickback 
laws in that the gifts are given to influence prescriptions.  From the government’s 
perspective, this is particularly problematic for patients receiving federal health coverage 
(DHHS 2002).  The compliance guidelines are to be finalized in 2003. 
The Issue of Small Gifts 
The OIG and others have found that nearly all doctors accept small gifts from drug 
sales people (OIG 1992, Wazana 2000).  Drug companies use office trinkets and foodstuffs 
to entice physicians to speak with company representatives (Jacobs 1999; Lichstein 1992; 
Ziegler 1995; Braithwate 1984; Hodges 1995).  The large majority of physicians meet with 
industry detailers several times a month (Lexchin 1989, Wazana 2000).  Many physicians 
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cite these gifts as the sole or among the top reasons for seeing drug detailers (Lexchin 1989; 
Wazana 2000; Jacobs 1999).   
Gifts such as pens and notepads, typically emblazoned with product names, are called 
“reminder items,” but their potential to influence prescribing extends beyond the 
advertisement they bear.  Industry gifts are seen by some physicians as a professional 
entitlement.  This is particularly the case for those in the professionalization process where 
respect from a sales representative and a free meal are relished.  Gifts and foods can be seen 
as a simple perk or a sign of career accomplishment and status. 
Industry proponents assert that because physician-detailer interaction raises 
awareness of new products, the practice benefits patients.  However, no evidence exists to 
support this claim.  In contrast, research suggests that physicians rely heavily on detailers for 
information and that the more doctors rely on commercial sources of information, the less 
likely they are to prescribe drugs in a manner consistent with patient needs.  Information 
provided by detailers is often biased, and sometimes dangerously misleading (Lexchin 1989, 
Ziegler 1995, Avorn 1982).  The reviews by Lexchin (1989, 1993) and Wazana (2000) 
correlate physician-detailer interactions with marked physician preferences for new products 
that hold no demonstrated advantage over existing ones, a decrease in the prescribing of 
generics, and a rise in both prescription expenditures and irrational and incautious 
prescribing.  
Many physicians deny the potential for the receipt of small promotional items to 
undermine their professional objectivity (Wazana 2000; Hodges 1995; Orlowski 1992; 
Steinman 2001; Rosner 1992; Banks 1992; Chren 1994; Aldir 1996; Gibbons 1998; 
Thompson 1994; Howard 2000; Davis 2000; Woollard 2003; Gorski 1990; Hume 1990; 
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Shaughnessy 1994; Roughead 1998).  In fact, researchers have found that the more gifts a 
physician receives, the more likely he or she is to believe that they do not influence behavior 
(Hodges 1995).  While medical professionals may believe themselves to be “more rational 
and critical” than the average person (Babcock 1997; Shaughnessy 1994), the success of 
pharmaceutical marketing illustrates that physicians are as susceptible to target marketing as 
others (Coste 1999).  Those who do not acknowledge the power of small gifts are the ones 
most likely to be influenced because their defenses are down. 
Small gifts play an important role in opening doors and promoting friendlier, more 
cooperative relationships between pharmaceutical sales representatives and physicians.  
Thus, as the following section explains, the effects of gifts on physician practices can be far 
greater than their minimal monetary value would imply. 
The Effects of Gifts, Large and Small, on Behavior 
 Gift exchange underlies the human tendency to engage in networks of obligation 
(Gouldner 1960; Mauss 1954; Levi-Strauss 1969).  When a gift or gesture of any size is 
bestowed, it imposes on the recipient a sense of indebtedness.  The obligation to directly 
reciprocate, whether or not the recipient is conscious of it, tends to influence behavior.  Many 
social scientists believe that the predilection to reciprocate is an adaptive mechanism that has 
helped bind and advance human societies by enabling exchange of food, skills, and goods 
(Leakey 1978).   
 The social rule of reciprocity imposes on the recipient an obligation to repay, in kind 
if possible, for favors, gifts, invitations, and the like (Levi-Strauss; Cialdini 1993, 16).  For 
example, when someone does us a favor, we are expected to return the favor at some point 
down the road.  Hence, the phrase “much obliged” is used as a synonym for “thank you.” 
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Feelings of obligation are not related to the size of the initial gift or favor.  For 
example, the success secret of the world’s record holder for car sales was to send mass-
produced greeting cards to his customers every month printed with the simple phrase “I like 
you” (Cialdini 1993, 174).  In another case, the owner of a pharmacy gave patrons a fifty cent 
key chain when they entered the store and the amount they spent on purchases increased 17% 
(Friedman 1990).  Similarly, when the Disabled American Veterans organization appeals for 
donations through direct mail solicitation, the response rate is about 18% when no gift is 
included, and 35% when the envelopes contain an unsolicited gift (e.g., inexpensive, 
customized address labels) (Cialdini 1993).  
Food, flattery, and friendship are all powerful tools of persuasion, particularly when 
combined.  Individuals tend to be more receptive to information when it is received while 
eating enjoyable food (Janis 1965).  This is why food is “the most commonly used technique 
to derail the judgment aspect of decision making” (Razran 1940).  The positive feelings 
associated with good food become projected on to the people and messages experienced 
while eating.  When sales people combine food with flattery, recipients tend to like them 
more, regardless of what it is they have to say.  Moreover, people are receptive to 
compliments even when they recognize that their source has a transparent agenda (Friedman 
1996).  The act of dining helps to foster cozier working relationships that may help break 
down professional barriers between physicians and sales representatives.  Positive social 
relationships are an effective way of engendering good will and making people want to 
reciprocate for gifts received (Perez 1989). 
 An amicable relationship, though, is not a prerequisite for compelled reciprocation.  
The reciprocity rule is so potent that people who are often disliked or distrusted, such as 
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politicians and sales people, can get people to comply with their wishes by imposing on them 
a small, unsolicited favor or gift (Cialdini 1993, 22).  This is exemplified by the “benefactor-
before-beggar” strategy of the Hare Krishnas.  Hare Krishnas commonly gathered in crowded 
airports and thrust trinkets, such as flowers and pamphlets, into the hands of passersby while 
saying, “this is our gift to you.”  Although recipients often tried unsuccessfully to refuse the 
small gift and ultimately threw it away, they were frequently so compelled to make a 
donation that the Hare Krishnas became quite wealthy.  However, airport patrons’ complaints 
about having to donate to the Krishnas resulted in airports prohibiting this mode of 
solicitation.   
 Airport patrons could have made the token gift giving of the Krishnas unprofitable by 
simply refusing to donate.  The act of accepting a gift directly from another person without 
reciprocating is so socially uncomfortable, however, that to many it is preferable to avoid or 
ban the interaction all together (Cialdini 1993, 22-24).  Reciprocation is so highly valued a 
social norm that those who do not reciprocate are often regarded with disgust and assigned 
negative labels, such as “moocher,” “ingrate,” “free-loader” and “welsher” (Cialdini 1993, 
20).  Regardless of the size of a gift, it is widely considered distasteful or bad form to take 
but make no effort to give in return (Cialdini 1993, 20).  Refusal to accept a gift or to give a 
gift in return signifies a refusal to cooperate, and is often considered a declaration of conflict 
(Mauss 1954). 
The natural tendency for people to accept gifts and kind gestures reduces their ability 
to choose to whom they wish to be indebted (Cialdini 1993, 30).  This is how the reciprocity 
rule can be exploited.  Oftentimes, the initial actor in reciprocal relationships not only 
chooses the form of the initial favor, but the form of the return favor as well.  If physicians 
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are to reciprocate for small gifts, they cannot do so in any form they please.  They are 
essentially compelled to reciprocate by supporting their benefactor’s products.  
Small Gifts: The Cost of Doing Business?  
 In the business world, gifts are a valuable, time-honored marketing tool because they 
keep doors of communication open between cooperating parties.  Medicine, in one view, is 
also a business.  Some believe that modest gift giving is appropriate and acceptable if it helps 
physicians be aware of and knowledgeable about the broad range of products available to 
them (Dodd 1999; Benbow 1999).  This is based on the premise that industry and physicians’ 
interests do not conflict because both are interested in learning how best to treat patients.  It 
is also premised upon the shallow and contradictory assertion that, but for the gifts, 
physicians would not spend the time and energy to meet with information-providing sales 
people even though what they have to gain can be helpful to their practice and their patients.  
Lay persons’ opinions regarding the acceptability of industry gifts are related to their 
perceptions of possible effects on prescribing behaviors and costs (Blake 1995).  Lay persons 
-- like physicians -- are likely to approve of physicians’ receipt of small promotional items or 
gifts relevant to patient care, and to disapprove of larger gifts and gifts that do not benefit 
patient care.  In one study, increased education (presumably excluding education in 
medicine) was correlated with the likelihood that lay persons would find certain gifts 
inappropriate (Mainous 1995).  Patients tend to be aware that physicians accept gifts, to be 
unaware whether their own physicians accept gifts, and to feel that gifts are more influential 
and less appropriate than do their physicians (Gibbons 1998). 
 The ethical acceptability of small gifts should turn on the character of the gift as well 
as its potential consequences.  One fundamental question is whether drug company gift 
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giving should be classified as a balanced exchange, where parties expect immediate and 
equal return, or as a negative exchange, where giving is motivated by profit so that parties 
seek to come out ahead in the transaction (Sahlins 1965).  According to PhRMA, the 
exchange is balanced because gifts are given as compensation for the time physicians spend 
becoming educated about products (Dembner 2001).  However, if the interests of physicians 
dovetail with those of industry, it follows that gifts are unnecessary because the valuable 
information provided to physicians is compensation enough for their time.   
Industry gift giving should, rather, be viewed as negative exchange because the 
practice is inherently profit-motivated, and the profit potential significantly exceeds the value 
of the gift.  Drug companies are purely interested and invested in the products physicians 
prescribe, and they know and expect that their marketing practices will pay off with 
increased sales.  Indeed, former President of Pfizer Pharmaceuticals Gerald Leubach was 
quoted as saying that marketing “is almost as scientific as anything we do” (Clark 1989).  
Drug companies do not deduct the cost of such gifts as charity, but as marketing 
expenses.  For tax purposes, business gifts are hardly considered gifts at all, because their 
giving does not arise out of a “detached and disinterested generosity” (Commissioner v. 
Duberstein 1949).  In this view, calling the giving of small tokens as part of the sales activity 
of pharmaceutical firms “gifts” is disingenuous and a transparent attempt to be 
nonjudgmental.  These “gifts” should be recognized for what they are: marketing wares. 
 While the benefits of promoting good will between physicians and the pharmaceutical 
industry cannot be discounted, the main objective of drug company gift giving is to create 
relationships and interests on the part of recipient physicians that conflict with their primary 
obligation to act in the best interest of their patients.  The practice is particularly problematic 
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because favors and promotional items of negligible value can influence behavior in ways the 
recipient does not often realize.  Research into the so-called “self-interest bias” has shown 
that it takes extraordinarily little to bias an individual’s interpretation and processing of 
information as well as one’s subjective judgments, including those dealing with ethics and 
fairness (Babcock 1997). 
 The fundamental question is whether the risk of bias from small commercially-
oriented gifts is acceptable. Implicit in many guidelines is the recognition that marketing 
wares create a conflict of interest, but that the risk of bias from items of negligible value is 
small and, on net, worth taking because of the potential benefits offered product marketing 
information.  Guidelines establishing thresholds, such as the arbitrary amount of $100, are 
based on the belief that there is a direct “dose response” –  that the risk of bias increases as 
the value of the gifted item increases.  There is no level, however, below which it is 
guaranteed that marketing wares have no effect on the recipient.    
The Need to Respond: Practical Considerations 
 Given that small gift giving can influence clinical judgment in ways that conflict with 
physicians’ fiduciary responsibilities, the question of how best to respond to the problem still 
remains.  Changes in the standards of acceptable professional conduct and pharmaceutical 
marketing practices may be in order, ranging from disclosure of gift exchange to elimination 
of the practice altogether.    
In June 2002, Vermont enacted legislation that requires pharmaceutical companies to 
disclose gifts worth more than $25 to the state pharmacy board (State of Vermont 2002).  
Wisconsin, New York, and Maine are considering similar legislation (Review 2002).  If gifts 
of all sizes are disclosed to federal or state regulators, valuable research can be conducted to 
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determine the extent to which gift acceptance is associated with physicians’ prescribing 
practices.  Disclosure policies can also take the form of requiring physicians to inform 
patients receiving prescriptions that they have received gifts from the drug’s manufacturer.  
Considering the extent to which physicians’ offices are adorned with drug company trinkets, 
it is likely that patients are already aware of the de minimis gifts physicians receive.  What 
they may not know is that these inexpensive penlights and notepads may actually undermine 
physician objectivity in ways that clash with their own medical and financial interests.  Full 
disclosure, therefore, could also require physicians to inform patients of this potential bias.  
Such disclosure, however, would not neutralize the bias, nor would it assist patients who 
have little choice but to rely on physicians’ judgments and little or no ability to combat the 
bias.  
 One obvious and compelling policy option in response to the evidence of the power 
of small gifts is to restrict or eliminate gift giving or gift acceptance.  Restrictions could take 
many forms, such as limiting the frequency of or settings for gift giving, such as conferences 
or to major holidays.  Enforcement of restrictions or bans could take various forms, including 
FDA regulation or ties to state medical licensure through state anti-kickback and bribery 
laws.  In light of the evidence that all gifts influence behavior, physicians and pharmaceutical 
firms could be sanctioned now for small gift exchange under current anti-kickback laws 
(Bulleit 1999).  The federal government has already indicated that gift-giving practices may 
be criminalized because of the presumable effects on governmental drug expenditures 
(DHHS 2002). 
 On the other hand, some may argue that the regulation of gift giving in medicine 
should be no stricter than it is in any other business context.  In response, we ask whether 
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physicians aspire to be viewed more like corporate salespeople or like professionals beholden 
to the public trust.  Most journalists are not permitted to accept gifts from information 
sources and university professors are prohibited from accepting gifts from students before 
grades are issued (www.presswise.org.uk/Washington%20Post.htm).  Judges, National 
Basketball Association referees and Major League Baseball umpires are all prohibited from 
accepting gifts of any size for any occasion from anyone with an interest in the outcomes of 
their judgments.  Similarly, medical professionals ought to step up to the plate.  When acting 
as patient advocates and trusted sources of information, physicians should carry out their 
professional activities in a way that minimizes the intrusion of avoidable conflicting interests. 
  We note that psychology research suggests that any imposed restrictions on 
physicians’ professional behavior are likely to be ill received and viewed as an affront to 
their personal integrity and professional freedom. Because people tend to desire freedoms 
more when faced with the threat of losing them (Worchell 1973; Cialdini 245 1993). 
restrictions would not only irritate physicians who (over)value drug company gifts, but 
physicians who have historically been indifferent toward them may find themselves valuing 
the gifts more.  The exaggerated desire for restricted behavior increases when the restrictions 
apply to one group and not another (Cialdini 1993, 245).  Therefore, if physicians liken 
themselves to business professionals, restrictions on gift exchange would be viewed as unfair 
because medicine would seem the only sector of US business prohibited from exchanging 
small gifts.  However, regulations barring the use of marketing wares would not, in actuality, 
regulate physician practices but only the sales practices of the pharmaceutical industry.  To 
our minds, a ban on industry gift giving would be inherently fair in that it would put all firms, 
including generics, on a level playing field.   
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 Nonetheless, we recognize that gift giving is the foundation of human interaction.  If 
it engenders valuable social obligations that are definitional of relationships such as 
friendship and camaraderie, then regulating the gift relationship may compromise desirable, 
arguably essential, social relations. Government regulations may, indeed, be too crude and 
heavy-handed an approach for micromanaging the fine lines between geniality and 
commercial inducement.  For example, company sponsored gifts to physicians clearly fall 
within the purview of government interest because they are ostensibly given for commercial 
purposes.  In contrast, a true gift (one that is not subsidized by a company) that is given to a 
physician by a sales representative with whom a preexisting, interpersonal relationship or 
friendship is shared (not merely a professional acquaintance or courtesy) should generally 
fall outside the purview of government interest and regulation.  It is the grey area in between 
that presents challenges with respect to the government’s ability to enforce restrictions on 
gift giving while refraining from dictating the boundaries of social interaction.  
We believe that, as a general rule, society ought not regulate the exchange of small 
tokens of courtesy in business or other social settings.  Medicine is different, however, and 
limits placed upon pharmaceutical companies use of marketing wares within this context 
would not be unfair, but both appropriate and enforceable.  The drug industry is highly 
regulated, and restrictions on marketing practices already are in place.  If the distribution of 
marketing wares were prohibited, associated expenses would no longer be deductible as a 
cost of business, and the practices would cease.  
The body of evidence reviewed above suggests that guidelines aimed at preserving 
professional objectivity by limiting the size of gifts physicians receive or companies 
distribute have thus far been short sighted.  The practice of small gift giving occurs in an 
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environment where physicians interact heavily with industry sales representatives, have their 
CME courses industry funded, receive information from industry-funded studies, are deluged 
with print advertising, and see patients targeted by direct-to-consumer advertising.  In an 
environment in which industry plays such a prominent role, it may be difficult to determine, 
even with rigorous research methods, which industry tactics wield the most influence and 
impossible to say with confidence that if the practice of small gift giving were to cease, 
prescribing practices would change. 
That said, from a moral and regulatory perspective, policies that determine the 
acceptability of a gift according to its size are unsound.  The power of gift giving, both large 
and small, must be acknowledged if appropriate regulatory policies are to be created and 
enforced.   
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